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Abstract. To counteract the lack of competition and innovation in the
financial services industry, the EU has issued the Second Payment Ser-
vices Directive (PSD2) encouraging account servicing payment service
providers to share data. The UK, similarly to other European countries,
has promoted a standard API for data sharing: the Open Banking Stan-
dard. We present an overview of the result of a formal security analysis
of the Account and Transaction API protocol.
1 Introduction
The lack of competition in the financial services industry has been one of the
main factors that led the European Union to introduce the second version of
the Payment Services Directive (PSD2) [14], which aims to improve competition
by enabling and encouraging bank account holders to share, in a controlled and
secure way, their account data. To provide a standard API for the sharing of cus-
tomer data across different banks, the UK, similarly to other European countries,
introduced the Open Banking Standard [13]. The regulation encompasses sev-
eral API specifications suitable for different Third Party Providers (TPPs) who
aim to service consumers that consent to sharing their data. The adoption of a
standardised interface allows interoperability and simplifies the implementation
of systems for sharing data between banks and TPPs.
Contribution In this paper, we present an overview of a formal security anal-
ysis of the Open Banking Standard APIs, focusing on the verification of the
correctness of the Account and Transaction API protocol. The work relies on
a previously proposed methodology [5] which provided a practical approach to
protocol modelling and verification. The methodology utilises the Alice and Bob
notation (AnB) [9] to specify a formal model of the protocol that can be formally
verified with the OFMC model checker [2]. We formalised and verified a number
of security goals that are implicit in the requirements. Although most goals were
satisfied in our analysis, the lack of rigourous definition of security properties in
the standard can be a source of ambiguity, potentially leading to different in-
terpretations of the security requirements in the implementation. To the best of
our knowledge, our model, fully presented in [1], is the first attempt to formally
analyse Open Banking protocols. Recently, other authors [7] made an evaluation
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of the integration of a web application with the Danish Nordea’s Open Bank-
ing APIs considering the security threats of the underlying technology, in light
of OWASP Top 10 Web Application Security Risks list. However, they did not
analyse the security of Open Banking itself considering and assessing security
goals as we did. Therefore, we believe this formal analysis can be valuable for
stakeholders considering the adoption of a standard that can have a significant
and long impact on the efficiency and security of the financial sector.
2 Open Banking Standard
The Open Banking Standard [13] aims at two key outcomes. The first one is
an open API for sharing data regarding the services offered by Account Servic-
ing Payment Service Providers (ASPSPs), e.g. banks. The other one is an open
API for sharing the account data of Payment Service Users (PSUs) provided
by ASPSPs. Open Banking is not only concerned about the API endpoints (e.g.
location of resources accessible by third parties, such as developers, to build
banking and financial applications), but also about data and security standards.
The data standard provides data models to the API data format. The API stan-
dard covers the API’s operational requirements. The security standard covers
API security requirements. An Account Information Service Provider (AISP) is
a regulated entity allowed by ASPSPs to access a PSU’s account data if the
PSU provides their consent. This type of access is read-only as the AISPs are
not expected to directly affect the payment accounts they are allowed access
to. An AISP can then provide different services having the PSU’s account and
transaction data, including applications that provide a user-friendly view of the
states of the different payment accounts held by the PSU, budgeting advice,
price comparisons and product recommendations.
Account and Transaction Protocol The protocol is initiated with the PSU
asking for information regarding their payment account(s) from an AISP (Step
1). The AISP then attempts to create an account access consent with the corre-
sponding ASPSP, based on the access permissions agreed upon with the PSU.
First, the AISP authenticates itself to the ASPSP through a client credential
grant, which is an approach for machine-to-machine authentication. The ASPSP
then provides the AISP with an access token used to request the creation of the
consent resource (Step 2). At this point, the created account access consent has
to be authorised to be used by the AISP to access the PSU’s account data.
This requires the PSUs to authenticate themselves to the ASPSP, followed by
authorising the consent. During this phase, the PSU has to select the payment
account(s) for which the chosen permissions should apply. The AISP then ob-
tains an access token to the account data (Step 3). With this token, the AISP
has to first retrieve the accessible accounts, including their unique IDs, through
the accounts endpoint. The IDs can later be used to request the data of specific
accounts (Step 4). To retrieve specific PSU account data (e.g. balances, transac-
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tions, direct debits, beneficiaries, etc.) the AISP will have to request the data via
the appropriate link using the correct endpoint and method from the ASPSP.
3 Methodology and Security Goals
The formal verification of Open Banking API presented in this work is based on
a protocol verification methodology proposed in [5]. The methodology utilises
the Alice and Bob notation (AnB) [9] to specify a formal model of the protocol
that can be formally verified through information flow (secrecy and authenticity)
goals. Such notation abstracts from implementation details, but allows formal
representation and analysis of the security-relevant characteristics of protocols.
An AnB specification comprises of several sections. The Types section de-
clares the different identifiers used in the protocol. This includes the agents,
constant and variable (random) numbers and transparent functions. Transpar-
ent functions are user-defined through their signature, thereby abstracting from
their implementation details (i.e. they are uninterpreted). The Knowledge sec-
tion describes the initial data each agent has before running the protocol. Fresh
values are initialised at runtime. The information flow is described in the Ac-
tions section, where details about messages exchanged by agents are specified.
Furthermore, the model can be used to verify specific security properties, such
as (weak and strong) authentication and secrecy goals:
– A weakly authenticates B on M: agent A has evidence that the message
M has been endorsed by agent B with the intention to send it to A (i.e.
non-injective agreement [8]);
– A authenticates B on M: weak authentication plus evidence of the fresh-
ness of the message M (i.e. injective agreement [8]);
– M secret between A, B: message M is kept secret among listed agents.
The formal model captures the protocol requirements [12]. While the Open
Banking API describes in details the information-flow, it lacks definitions of
security goals that the exchanges between agents are meant to convey. Therefore,
part of our work consisted in identifying suitable goals for the protocol model.
For the verification, we used the Open-Source Fixed-Point Model-Checker
(OFMC) [10], a symbolic model-checker supporting the AnB notation. Moreover,
the AnBx Compiler and Code Generator [11] was used to pre-process the model
to benefit from a stricter type system and support the extension to AnB that
allows named expression abstractions (Definitions section).
The goals we identified (and verified) are based on our understanding of the
protocol and on its dependencies. For example, OAuth 2.0 security considera-
tions [6, P.52-P.60], protocol use cases in [13, P.20-P.23] and our expectations of
the protocol.
We identified eight goals: four on message secrecy, and four on authentication.
fAISPSecret(AISP) secret between AISP,aspspA #G1
fPSUSecret(PSU) secret between PSU,aspspA #G2
ClientToken, AuthToken secret between AISP,aspspA,aspspR #G3
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# FAILED initially + Fixed #A2.3
PSU authenticates aspspR on fGetIntent(Intent) #G4
aspspR authenticates PSU on SelectedAccounts #G5
PSU weakly authenticates AISP on ASPSPAuthPSUEndP,AISPEndP #G6
# FAILED + Fixed #A4.1 #A4.2
Accounts secret between AISP, aspspR #G7
AISP authenticates aspspR on Accounts #G8
Two goals (G1 and G2) are obvious: the exchanged secrets/credentials between
the AISP and PSU and the authorisation server remain secret whilst requesting
for a client token (Action 2.1 in the specification) and acquiring consent autho-
risation (A3.1.2 and A3.3.3). That is because if the AISP credentials are leaked
(A2.1), many attacks would be possible (for instance [6, Sect. 10.2] discusses
client impersonation). Another secrecy goal (G3) states that various exchanged
tokens (A2.2–A2.3 and A3.3.4–A4.1) remain secret between the AISP and the
authorisation and resource servers. As tokens are AISP bound, a compromised
token cannot be directly used. However, [6, Sect. 10.3] requires tokens to be con-
fidential, to prevent attacks involving valid token injection [6, Sect. 10.12]. These
goals clearly indicate the inherited potential vulnerabilities of the Account and
Transaction Protocol (ATP) dependencies. The final secrecy goal (G7) is about
the resource server message to the AISP (A4.2) and is obvious: account infor-
mation must remain secret.
The authentication goals relate to the PSU authenticating the consent re-
source to authorise (G4), the resource server authenticating the PSU’s selected
accounts information (G5) and the AISP authenticating the PSU’s account in-
formation from the resource server (G8). This last goal between the AISP and
the resource server is crucial in verifying the integrity of the account data sent
to the AISP by the resource server. In addition to direct data modification, it is
important to verify that old data cannot be replayed. For instance, in the case of
affordability check, if the PSU was an intruder and modified the data, they could
trick an AISP into providing a product they are not eligible for. This goal also
enforces fraud detection: if the transactional data can be modified by an intruder
to hide fraudulent activity. Given the redirections from the PSU to the autho-
risation server and AISP (A3.1.1 and A3.3.1–A3.3.2), we weakly authenticate
that those endpoints cannot be modified by an intruder to help avoid redirected
URI manipulation [6, Sect. 10.6] and phishing attacks [6, Sect. 10.11] (G6).
Model Development. The Open Banking ATP is complex and with mul-
tiple dependencies. The AnB model aims to provide an abstract and accurate
view of its essential aspects and to verify key properties. The initial AnB model
was overly detailed with unnecessary data exchanges. To reach the right level
of abstraction, we then decided to first determine the protocol goals prior to
abstracting. Even after such endevour, verification was unwieldy: it ran for over
two days without response. As is common within model checking problems, state
explosion must be tackled beyond abstracting details, abstract on irrelevant data.
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Restricting the role of the PSU, where it had to be different from the AISP
and servers, considerably reduced the state space. This led to termination with
goal verification to be reduced to about seven hours. This enabled us to identify
further steps to abstract related to data, which reduced the verification time
to about six minutes. A final abstraction, related to the various TLS-related
steps, was to abstract them using AnB bullet channels, used to model channels
providing authentication and/or secrecy properties at the end-points. The in-
ternal efficiency of OFMC dealing with such channels led the final version to
verify within eight seconds. This exponential efficiency (up to 5 orders of mag-
nitude) increase is not uncommon in model checking problems, so long the right
abstractions are taken alongside expert knowledge of the tool’s implementation.
Model Correctness. We used the OFMC model checker [2] to verify the
eight goals described above. At first, three goals (G4,G7,G8 ) about PSU intent
authentication and account information secrecy and integrity failed. This led
us to check these goals independently in order to study their reason for failure
quickly. The witness for the PSU authentication failure (G4 ) relates to the re-
source server authenticating with an unknown agent rather than the PSU. This
was fixed by having the resource server being aware of the PSU’s identity early
on when setting up the access consent with the AISP (A3.2). Thus, this failure
identifies a previously undocumented vulnerability, which our modification fixes.
The account information goals fail due to a limitation of bullet channels: they
do not protect against replay attacks, hence their use here allowed breaking both
secrecy (G7 ) and integrity (G8 ). The intruder could respond to the AISP’s re-
quest for account data by replaying a previous message. This breaks integrity
as the response received by the AISP, and perceived to be the account data,
has been modified. As the data replayed is known to the intruder, it also breaks
secrecy of the account data. However, the TLS protocol does protect against
message replay [4, P.93-P.94]. To deal with this limitation and ensure that fresh-
ness would resolve the issue, we modified the model to include a nonce generated
and sent by the AISP when requesting for the PSU account data and is expected
to be part of the response.
These modifications enable checking all goals for one session. Multiple ses-
sions verification is important as there could be attacks relying on multiple
concurrent protocol runs. Due to increased state space and limited hardware, we
were unable to fully verify the model for two parallel sessions. As customary in
under such conditions (e.g. [3] for iKP and SET), we were able to obtain partial
results by increasing the search space up to the available resource limits (search
space depth: 15 plies, 14.5GB RAM, 50 hours to run) without being able to
reach any attack state.
4 Conclusion
The novel Open Banking Account and Transaction protocol is a security-critical
protocol, which is being enforced on the largest banks in Europe. Given the
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protocol’s significance and expected wider use, verifying its correctness is crucial.
Our findings were disseminated as part of a presentation on PSD2 at a UK
Finance event, with representatives from Visa and MasterCard, as well as several
banks. Some of the identified goals were known, others not. The audience was
particularly keen on the time/cost analysis. Our future work will focus on the
modelling of the protocol’s state and transparent functions specification in VDM-
SL: this is aimed at discovering underlying vulnerabilities related to the myriad
of dependant technologies (e.g. OAuth2, TLS, etc.).
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9. Mödersheim, S.: Algebraic properties in Alice and Bob notation. In: Int. Conf.
on Availability, Reliability and Security (ARES 2009). pp. 433–440 (2009).
https://doi.org/10.1109/ARES.2009.95
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